How much is the bill? Simulating selected proposals for income policy adjustments during the 2017 Bulgarian parliamentary election campaigns by Venelin Boshnakov
How much is the bill? 
Simulating selected 
proposals for income 
policy adjustments during 





JEL: D31, H24, H31
doi: 10.3326/pse.41.3.2
*   The author of this article is grateful for the contribution of all former and current members of the EUROMOD 
consortium for its creation and development, especially for the establishment of its Bulgarian section. 
The process of the enhancement and upgrading of EUROMOD is supported financially by grants from 
the General Directorate “Employment, Social Affairs, and Inclusion” of the European Commission 
(Programmes PROGRESS and EaSI). The empirical results here are derived by version G4.0 of EUROMOD 
through processing of EU-SILC-2015 User Database provided by Eurostat. The author is however solely 
responsible for any possible errors in calculation or interpretation of the presented empirical results. Particular 
appreciation is owed to two anonymous reviewers as well as the participants in the Scientific Workshop 
“Social Protection Policies and Microsimulation” (Zagreb, 12-13 June 2017) and the EUROMOD 2017 
Annual Meeting for their helpful remarks.
**  Received: July 23, 2017 
Accepted: August 7, 2017
Venelin BOSHNAKOV
















































































41 (3) 299-314 (2017)
300 abstract
The paper presents preliminary results from a sequence of microsimulation exer-
cises implementing a selection of initiatives for income policy adjustments in Bul-
garia. These initiatives originate from various income policy reform proposals 
that were publicly discussed during the 2017 parliamentary election campaigns. 
The paper provides empirical assessment of the possible budgetary effects of these 
proposals, assuming that these reforms are implemented in year 2017. The calcu-
lations are performed in EUROMOD – the tax-benefit microsimulation model for 
EU countries.
Keywords: income taxation, reform proposals, elections campaigns, microsimula-
tion, Bulgaria
1 IntroductIon
1.1 MotIVatIon and Goals
At the start of 2017 Bulgaria entered a tough political debate on a range of 
 problematic issues raised during the parliamentary election campaigns. The main 
political parties put forward their proposals for the adjustment of taxation and in-
come policies, in response to public expectations. Indeed, these expectations have 
a long history – about 15 years of neoliberal economic policy that introduced a 
10% flat rate for personal income tax, brought about a substantial shift in the bur-
den of social insurance from employers to employees, and focused income sup-
port on a narrow share of the population. Combined with the effects of the eco-
nomic downturn of the 2008-2009 crisis, this policy inevitably induced persistent 
poverty, emigration, and negative demographic trends (Beleva and Dimitrov, 
2014; Tosheva et al., 2016).
The paper suggests some preliminary results from a sequence of microsimulation 
exercises that produce estimates of the budgetary effects of a selection of initia-
tives for income policy adjustments discussed during the 2017 election cam-
paigns. Most of these initiatives are targeted to reforming income support policies, 
taking two main types of approach – assistance- or taxation-based. For example, 
a proposal has been made to ease the task of bringing up children by working 
parents through the introduction of a child tax credit, replacing the tax base ex-
emption for dependent children, which is deemed ineffective. An overall proposi-
tion for family taxation and joint filing is currently under debate, although it was 
already frequently considered in a series of political disputes during the market 
transition period. Furthermore, a minimum pension proposal has been hotly dis-
cussed, with mutual accusations of misleading populism. Along the same lines is 
a suggestion for a substantial expansion of the eligibility for targeted social as-
sistance for heating and energy.
An overall impression is that none of the ideas for policy reforms or adjustments 
of policy parameters seem to be supported by a sound empirical analysis of the 
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301fects of such proposals have been announced – the tentative “bill” of each reform 
is not “submitted” to the taxpayer, nor it is clear to the public how the expanded 
deficit of the social budget could be compensated for.
The paper provides an empirical assessment of the possible non-neutral budgetary 
effects of selected proposals for policy adjustments – basically, the necessary 
shifts in the social spending budget – if implemented in the year 2017. The calcu-
lations are performed by EUROMOD – the tax-benefit microsimulation model for 
EU countries (Sutherland and Figari, 2013; De Agostini et al., 2014). Its Bulgarian 
section utilizes large sample data for Bulgarian households provided by several 
waves of the EU-SILC survey.
1.2 a sHort oVerVIeW of IncoMe trends
The socio-economic development of Bulgaria at the time of the electoral debate is 
characterized by the consequences of the global crisis of 2008-2009 on the eco-
nomic situation and the search for effective ways of regaining the pre-crisis levels of 
investment (especially FDI), employment, and exports. Another important issue is 
also in the focus of the debate: the steady establishment of the substantial depend-
ence of the country on EU funding for all major structural reforms and overall eco-
nomic revitalization. In the light of this, public interest during the election cam-
paigns has become sensitive to all issues related to living standards, income policies 
and social support for the vulnerable, e.g. the old, unemployed, disabled and so on. 
In spite of the overall positive trend in the dynamics of the income level during the 
post-crisis period – coinciding largely with the first decade of Bulgarian full EU 
membership– the “status quo” of the “poorest EU country” has been emphasized 
and utilized by the argumentation throughout the campaign.
Nevertheless, the dynamics of the main income indicators showed recent trends 
somehow opposite to the adverse demographic shifts. A stable negative rate of 
natural population growth amounting to about -5 per 1,000 residents and con-
tinual emigration led to a severe decline in total population size (from 7.5 to 7.1 
million in the period 2010-2016). In the first half of the 2010s, the average number 
of children per family has persistently stabilized at about one child (figure 1). 
In the same period, the average monthly wage has constantly grown from about 
BGN 650 to over BGN 1,000 (50% for the period) followed by even faster growth 
of the minimum wage. As a result, the ratio of the minimum to average wage in-
creased from 37% to 45% in the early 2017 (figure 2). As officially announced, the 
governments in charge during the post-crisis period have controlled the growth of 
remuneration levels by linking them to the growth of GDP per capita as a measure 
of aggregate productivity. The GDP elasticity of the average annual gross wage is 
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302 Figure 1
Dynamics of total population (million), rate of natural population growth (NPG), 


















2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Population (Mn) Rate of NPG (‰) Average NCF
Note: Right axis – average number of children per family.
Source: NSI (2017); author’s calculations.
Figure 2 

















2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Average wage (BGN) Minimum wage (BGN) Ratio min/avg (%)
Notes: 1 BGN ≈ 0.5 EUR. Right axis – the annual ratio of minimum to average wage.
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303In summary, according to Eurostat (2017), in all the 10 years of EU full member-
ship, Bulgarian society was obsessed with the country’s occupying the lowest 
position among EC member states regarding, for example, the minimum wage (EUR 
184 for 2015, as compared to EUR 218 in Romania, EUR 300 in Lithuania, etc.) and 
GDP per capita in PPS (relative level of 46 for 2016 with 100 for EU28, 59 for 
Romania and Croatia, 65 for Latvia, etc.). This naturally provided many options 
for the political opponents to search for electoral support utilizing the existing ap-
prehension and expectations of Bulgarians regarding the short-run income policies.
Figure 3 




























GDP per capita (thousand BGN)
Source: NSI (2017); author’s calculations.
1.3 brIef lIterature reVIeW
The specialised literature provides empirical evidence regarding Bulgarian tax-
benefit policies and their effects, mainly regarding research into income distribu-
tion, inequality, and poverty (e.g., Cerami and Stanescu, 2009; Tsanov and Bog-
danov, 2012; Tsanov et al., 2014; Tosheva et al., 2016; Mihaylova and Bratoeva-
Manoleva, 2017). Specific issues concerning targeted social assistance in Bul-
garia, specifically “energy poverty” and the related social support instruments, are 
analysed by Shopov (2013, 2016). Major sources of income inequality in Bul-
garia for 2007 were analysed using decomposition methods and quantile regres-
sion by Mintchev, Boshnakov and Naydenov (2010). Empirical studies of the 
contribution of income sources to the level of income inequality in Bulgaria have 
been recently updated by Mihaylova and Bratoeva-Manoleva (2017) following 
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304 Bogdanov and Zahariev (2009) provide an overview of the policies related to mini-
mum income support in Bulgaria implemented in the 2000s. The most up-to-date 
presentation of social protection instruments can be found in Tosheva et al. (2017), 
provided for the maintenance of the Bulgarian section of EUROMOD where the 
regimes of both simulated and non-simulated social benefits are explained in the 
overall framework of the Bulgarian tax-benefit system for the period 2014-2017. 
Apart from the cross-country distributional analyses of the changes in tax-benefit 
systems on income inequality and poverty levels in Europe (e.g. EUROMOD, 
2017), several studies utilize the capabilities of EUROMOD to assist specific analy-
ses for Bulgaria. Boshnakov, Tosheva and Draganov (2013) provide evidence for 
the expected gains in poverty reduction through simulation of scenarios for updating 
the social assistance benefit based on the guaranteed minimum income (GMI) policy 
parameter. A detailed study of income assistance schemes by Tasseva (2016) finds 
that – although a substantial share of the beneficiaries of assistance through GMI 
and heating allowances is located at the left tail of the income distribution – this 
policy’s impact on poverty is minor since these benefits reach a small fraction of the 
poor: only about 12% through GMI and 25% through targeted benefit for heating. 
Tosheva et al. (2016) provide empirical results that assess the effects from changes 
in tax-transfer policies (enacted in the period 2011-2015) on income distribution, 
inequality and poverty in Bulgarian households. Their results show that the changes 
in the policies induced positive income shifts mainly for the households in the low-
est income groups. Furthermore, the poverty rate has decreased by 1.3-2.9 percent-
age points (depending on the level of poverty threshold chosen).
2 MaJor PolItIcal forces: PolItIcal debate and “MessaGes”
The 2017 election campaigns were not substantially different to those conducted 
during the past 20 years, which was a period of relative stabilization after the hy-
perinflation crisis and banking system collapse of 1995-1996, followed by the 
introduction of the Currency Board Arrangement in 1997 and stabilization of the 
macroeconomic indicators. In most cases, the debate has been between the major 
left- and right-centred political forces, with the participation of minor liberal, cen-
trist, and (less significantly) ultra-left or nationalistic wings.
The leading role during the 2017 election campaigns was played by CEDB (Citi-
zens for European Development of Bulgaria) – the political party that just came 
out of central government offices with the role of a “proponent” of the established 
current economic and social policies. Its election platform was publicly announced 
on the party’s website1 as well as through participation of CEDB representatives 
in media and other communication events. The major “messages” of the leading 
party did not deviate much from the “low taxes/low deficits” postulates imple-
mented by Bulgarian governments since 2001. In this line, the underpinnings of 
its campaign were basically:
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305 – the undisputable status quo of the 10% flat PIT rate and the relatively low burden 
of compulsory social insurance (with the current employer/employee split)2;
 – main sources for increasing the public revenues identified as: tightened ad-
ministrative operations, with a better focus on counteracting corruption (in-
cluding pressures on the grey economy, underreporting, customs misconduct 
facilitating smuggling/trafficking, etc.);
 – strict control over the expenditures, assuming the argument “redistribute 
only what you collect” – as a result, social spending focused only on those 
who objectively cannot manage in the labour market (the old, disabled, fam-
ilies in extreme poverty and so on);
 – family support provided mainly through improved community services (kin-
dergartens), financial support to children if at school and such like.
The program rarely announces quantitative targets and other policy parameters, 
which shows its great caution regarding any “promises” the keeping of which will 
be able to be verified in due time. Just few numerical parameters were modestly 
defined, e.g.:
 – increment of all pensions by 2.4% since July 2017 (which was planned dur-
ing the budgetary process of 2016);
 – support to the so called “3-child family model”, although not accompanied 
by any specific policy instruments except a general vow concerning targeted 
financial support to a third child, with a reduction of this support to subse-
quent children;
 – few targets that are, however, spread over the whole 4-year mandate: macro-
economic expectations for at least 2% GDP annual real growth rate; average 
and minimum monthly wages to reach 1,500 and BGN 650 respectively, at the 
end of the mandate (i.e. about 50% growth in both wages, or 12% annually).
A similar general platform was announced by the prospective governmental part-
ner of CEDB – which actually became so after the election – the United Patriots 
coalition3. It generally lacks any quantitative policy parameters, emphasizing mas-
sive political and administrative enforcement of a range of measures, e.g. revision 
of concessions and contracts; “strike against monopolistic and oligopolistic struc-
tures”; reorganization of the customs service, from which a gain of BGN 2 billion 
(about 2% of GDP) is expected from anti-smuggling measures; empowerment of 
the State Bank to credit SMEs; and enforcement of a state employment programme 
“providing a job for every Bulgarian”. An important suggestion raised in the au-
tumn of 2016 (during the presidential elections) has been kept – the introduction 
of a minimum floor of BGN 300 for the contributory old-age pension. The related 
necessary budget was not clearly evaluated; however, a general idea for its provi-
2 The total wedge of social insurance contributions in the total expenditures for labour inputs for 2017 is 24% 
split in the 13.9/10.1 ratio between the employer and employee; this wedge for 2007 was 36.2% (23.8/12.4).
3 An alliance of 3 parties: National Front, Ataka, and IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organiza - 
tion, a successor of a historical configuration from the national liberation period) – fragments of the national-
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306 sion has been outlined concerning a rigorous revision of the regime and practices 
for disability categorization and determination of disability pensions and benefits. 
The main opposition forces were represented by the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) 
– a political organization integrating the social-democratic wings of the former to-
talitarian party-ruler of the country up to 1989. Although its political platform4 was 
announced as an “ultimate and only reasonable” alternative to the liberal and right-
centre platforms, it raises a range of modest proposals aligned to the traditional 
values of the Party of European Socialists (following the general idea of “leaving no 
one behind” policies). Conforming to the general framework of low deficit policies 
(specifically emphasizing compliance with the Maastricht deficit criterion), several 
policy parameters were targeted in respect to income policies. The main ones were:
 – an upgrade to the monthly benefit for raising a child aged between 1 and 2 
– up to the minimum wage level, i.e. by 35% – from BGN 340 (not uprated 
since year 2014) to BGN 460;
 – double expansion of the coverage of the targeted benefit for heating – a spe-
cial tool expected to provide a vast support from low-income voters;
 – a targeted reform of the flat PIT: the introduction of a twice higher marginal 
tax rate (20%) for incomes above BGN 120,000 annually, which is equal to 
about 10 average wages for 2017 (another “tool” for mobilizing ultra-left 
voters with the idea of “taxing the top incomes higher”);
 – a substantial revision of the PIT policy for treatment of the children – na-
mely, introduction of a child tax-credit and abolishment of the regime for tax 
base exemption for raising children. The proposal is however generally for-
mulated “to support the parents who work – and have taxable earnings – for 
raising their children”. According to the proposal, they must receive an an-
nual refund of the tax bill: BGN 600 for 1 child (BGN 50 monthly) and BGN 
1,000 for 2 or more children.
All proposals originating from political fragments that strive to gain significant 
support are clearly justified by expectations of massive support from targeted so-
cial strata. In some cases – as will be shown below – these strata include a substan-
tial number of potential voters. With the assumption of a 50% turnout, typical of 
parliamentary elections in Bulgaria (it reached actually 54% in 2017), the votes of 
even half of the potential “beneficiaries” from some of the proposals could pro-
vide significant positive shifts in the overall position of the respective party-pro-
ponent. However, what the budgetary effect of the introduction of any such pro-
posal would be remains unclear, i.e. the question “how much is the bill and who 
will have to pay it” does not have any reasonable answer, and various speculations 
were floated during the election campaigns.
3 eValuatIon of selected reforM ProPosals
3.1 MetHodoloGIcal Issues
The quantitative evaluation of selected proposals for income policy reforms in 
Bulgaria is performed by the method of tax-benefit microsimulation implemented 
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307in EUROMOD. Such a simulation method has several important qualities one of 
which is particularly valuable for the present study, namely, “… the possibility of 
accurately evaluating the aggregate financial cost/benefit of a reform. The results 
obtained … at the individual level can be aggregated (using the weights contained 
in the datasets where necessary) at the macro level, allowing the analyst to exam-
ine the effect of the policy on government budget constraints” (Spadaro, 2007: 
20). Such a type of reliable weighting is available in the EU-SILC survey, which 
provides large representative datasets for the implementation of procedures within 
the EUROMOD model. In particular, the calculations here are performed on the 
basis of the Eurostat UDB data containing the results from the Bulgarian SILC 
2015 operation, which provides income data at year 2014. All relevant variables 
are appropriately uprated to their projected levels for the year 2017, using official 
statistics for a range of income policy parameters and aggregates evaluated for the 
years 2015 and 2016. Certainly, some tax-benefit instruments appear to be over-
simulated while others are under-simulated, for one reason or another (see To-
sheva et al., 2017) – these deviations are inherent to tax-benefit microsimulation 
analyses and the results must be interpreted with some degree of caution.
3.2 eMPIrIcal results froM PolIcY sIMulatIons
Proposal 1. Minimum contributory old-age pension
The “pension for insurance and old age” (PIOA) is provided to individuals who 
have reached the standard retirement age (about 61 for women and 64 for men) 
with a minimum length of contributory service of 35 (women) and 38 (men) years. 
Figure 4 presents the distribution of PIOA recipients by the main intervals of the 
monthly pension and shows that 45% of them are below the line of the announced 
proposal: an unconditional floor of BGN 300. 
Figure 4 
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308 Table 1 
Simulation results (Proposal 1: Minimum threshold for PIOA)
Indicator Value note
Number of PIOA recipients 1,834,875
   Incl. recipients of pension < BGN 300 836,716 45.6% of the total number
Total expenditures for PIOA (baseline) 7,574 Million BGN
Total expenditures for PIOA (proposal) 8,399 Million BGN
Deficit:   -826 Million BGN
Deficit as a percentage of PIOA expenditures    -10.9
Deficit as a percentage of expected 2017 GDP    -0.85
Source: EUROMOD output; author’s calculations.
The potential power of this political “pledge” is substantial. Having a mass of over 
800 thousand receivers of PIOA below this threshold – and expected 50% elec-
toral participation – the expected support for the proponents (United Patriots) 
seemed to have been at least few hundred thousand of pensioners recruited from 
the lowest income stratum.
The results from the simulation of this proposal (table 1) provide an estimate of 
BGN 826 million as a summary amount required for topping-up every pension 
below the BGN 300 threshold. The “bill” amounts to 0.85% of GDP – a serious 
potential deficit which requires harsh measures, cutting other budgetary items or 
lifting the taxation burden – otherwise, the achievement of the Maastricht limit for 
the central budget deficit could be substantially jeopardised. Nevertheless, during 
the political campaign such a “promise” can have (and it actually did have, al-
though not to the expected extent) a decisive role in the final results of the nation-
alistic coalition.
Proposal 2. Expanding the scope of the targeted benefit for heating
The targeted benefit for heating (TBH) is provided as a non-contributory allow-
ance which, however, is income-tested – it is granted to individuals that live alone 
or to families with incomes that are below the “differentiated minimum income 
for TBH purposes” (DMI); the claimants should also meet additional eligibility 
criteria. DMI is calculated by a procedure similar to that applied for the universal 
social assistance benefit for low income – based on a set of ratios linked to some 
preliminarily defined categories of beneficiaries and attached to the Guaranteed 
Minimum Income parameter (GMI = BGN 65; see Tosheva et al., 2017). If eligi-
ble, the unit (individual or a family) is approved to receive a monthly benefit of 
BGN 72 for 5 months during the heating season, targeted to cover some defined 
heating expenditures.
In order to expand the scope of the eligible receivers of TBH the thresholds have 
been relaxed in order to ease access to the benefit for a selection of targeted indi-
viduals (single mothers, the elderly, and the disabled). For example, any person 
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309gets an uprated threshold to guarantee eligibility if her/his income is below BGN 
300 – the current ratio of 2.7268 is increased to 4.6154. Thus, if the test shows that 
the income of this individual is less than 4.6154*GMI = BGN 300, then her/his 
eligibility for TBH is approved. Further categories that get uprating of the thresh-
old up to 4.6154 are:
 – persons aged over 65 and living alone;
 – persons older than 70;
 – persons with reduced working capacity of 50% or more living alone;
 – single parents with a child younger than 18 (or 20 and in education);
 – children aged below 18, with a permanent disability.
Table 2 presents the results from the simulated proposal 2. The baseline estimates 
show about 368 thousand expected receivers of TBH under the standard condi-
tions along with BGN 133 million on aggregate for the simulated amount of the 
benefit.
Table 2 
Simulation results (Proposal 2: Targeted benefit for heating)
Indicator Value note
Simulated TBH beneficiaries (baseline) 368,223 Number
Simulated amount of TBH (baseline) 133.4 Million BGN
Simulated TBH beneficiaries (proposal) 701,757 Number
Gain in recipients 333,534
Simulated amount of TBH (proposal) 254.2 Million BGN
Deficit (million BGN) -120.8
Deficit as a percentage of TBH expenditures -90.6
Deficit as a percentage of expected 2017 GDP -0.124
Source: EUROMOD output; author’s calculations.
After the introduction of the reform – although targeted only to the categories 
presented above – the number of eligible recipients is expanded by over 333 thou-
sand. This number can still be increased by including another targeted category of 
individuals in the scope of the simulation exercise. The budgetary effect is not 
substantial – this political goal can be achieved by a small additional deficit of 
0.1% of GDP (which will not even emerge if GDP actually grows at least by half 
a percentage point more than the macroeconomic budgetary forecast).
Proposal 3. Introduction of a 20% marginal PIt rate for top incomes
Various proposals for discarding the flat PIT rate regime have been initiated with 
the expectation that a return to the progressive income taxation (abandoned since 
year 2008) will provide higher PIT revenues along with “restoration of social eq-
uity”. However, none of these succeeded in gathering enough political support 
among the governing coalitions led by CEDB after 2009. Paradoxically, the intro-
duction of flat PIT rate was done while a coalition led by BSP (2005-2009) was in 
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310 fied by the necessity to collaborate with their neoliberal coalition partners. Acting 
as opposition in the 2017 campaign, and expecting to mobilize a significant voting 
potential (i.e. supporters of the idea “to tax the rich higher”), the socialist platform 
raised a proposal for introducing a threshold (BGN 120,000) for the annual taxa-
ble income. All incomes above this threshold must be taxed at a rate twice as high 
than the standard rate (20%). Table 3 presents the aggregate results from the simu-
lation exercise accomplishing this proposal assuming “all other things equal”. 
These results however should be considered with caution due to problematic is-
sues of the SILC survey related to underestimation of the “upper tail” of the in-
come distribution due to under-coverage of such taxpayers (e.g. refusals to par-
ticipate), under-reporting of earnings, etc. (Tosheva et al., 2017).
Table 3 
Simulation results (Proposal 3: 20% marginal PIT rate for top incomes)
Indicator Value note
Simulated PIT payers (baseline) 3.883 Million
Simulated amount of PIT (baseline) 3.336 Bn. BGN
Simulated PIT payers above the proposed threshold (BGN 120,000) 3,778 Number
Percentage of the total number  0.1
Simulated amount of PIT (proposal) 3.353 Bn. BGN
Additional revenue (million BGN) 0.017 Bn. BGN
Percentage of the additional in total revenue  0.5
Percentage of the additional PIt revenue in the expected 2017 
GdP  0.02
Source: EUROMOD output; author’s calculations.
The results show clearly that negligible budgetary effects can be expected from 
such a reform, even in the case of the static calculations performed by EURO-
MOD – about BGN 17 million (0.5% of the total PIT revenues and 0.02% of the 
expected GDP for 2017). The taxpayers that have official (reported) incomes 
above the policy threshold are just 0.1% of all PIT taxpayers – the narrow scope 
of this reform proposal identifies it as much more of a propaganda tool than a 
genuine income policy reform.
Proposal 4. Introduction of PIt reform for child tax credit
In a similar manner, suggestions for joint filing and favourable tax treatment of the 
family have been discussed since the start of market transition in Bulgaria. Indeed, 
one special form of “family taxation” was introduced in 2005 and practiced for 3 
years (removed in 2008 with the introduction of the flat PIT rate), namely, tax base 
deductions for raising 1, 2 or 3+ children. This practice was reintroduced in 2015 
– one of the parents could reduce her/his annual tax base by BGN 200 for the first 
child, BGN 400 additionally for a second child, plus BGN 600 for all other chil-
dren in the family. The tax exemption rule can be utilized by one of the parents 
(expectedly, the one with higher PIT base) without any joint filing. So annually, a 
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311reduction of the annual PIT by BGN 60 (or BGN 12 per month, 4 plus 8 for child 
1 and child 2). 
During the election campaign the BSP suggested the introduction of a child tax 
credit – reduction of the annual PIT duty by BGN 600 (if there is 1 child) or BGN 
1,000 (if 2 or more children are being raised in the family). This makes an “allow-
ance” of BGN 50 monthly for child 1 and BGN 33.33 additionally for the second 
child, which, however, is non-refundable. The political “message” seems clear – 
all those working parents who have low incomes (with PIT duty up to these 
thresholds) that raise their children will be supported by the government not by 
social assistance, but by leaving all of their (already) earned income – except the 
compulsory social insurance – in the family to meet the ever growing needs re-
lated to childcare.
Table 4 presents the results from the simulation of a simple scenario for the intro-
duction of such a version of unconditional child tax credit. The data from the SILC 
survey show a predominant presence of cases of the “first” (which is often the 
only child in the family) and the “second” child being the targets of the policy.
Table 4 
Simulation results (Proposal 4: Child tax credit)
Indicator Value note
Number of children (total)  1,311 Thousand
     Cases “first child” 873 Thousand
     Cases “second child” 352 Thousand
     Cases “third or next child” 86 Thousand
Simulated amount of PIT (baseline)  3.336 Bn. BGN
Simulated amount of CTC (proposal)  0.665 Bn. BGN
Simulated PIT, residual  2.671 Bn. BGN
Percentage of the reduction in baseline PIt 19.9
Percentage of the reduction in the expected 2017 GdP  0.68
Source: EUROMOD output; author’s calculations.
The simulated child tax credit identified in these two cases amounts to BGN 665 
million. In this static version of the simulation exercise no behavioural responses 
are assumed – the result shows what the expected change in the PIT revenue in 
2017 would be if the parent (with the largest taxable income) were allowed to 
deduct the proposed amount of child tax credit from her/his tax liability. The ques-
tion that concerns the budgetary planners – about how to compensate the deficit of 
20% in the PIT revenue – requires additional calculations and initiation of parallel 
proposal(s) related to necessary alternations of the existing family support poli-
cies. At the stage of the electoral campaign, the sources of funds for the coverage 
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312 4 conclusIons
The empirical results about the effects of selected proposals for income policy 
adjustments evaluated in this article were obtained by the utilization of the capa-
bilities of EUROMOD – European-wide microsimulation model that assists the 
analyses of tax-transfer interventions on personal and household incomes in the 
EU countries. The information basis of the empirical analysis here is derived from 
the annual large sample representative survey of household income components in 
the EU countries (EU-SILC) which ensures the required degree of reliability and 
validity of the achieved results. The capacities of EUROMOD for the evaluation 
of particular proposals about reforming tax-transfer policies are substantial but 
still underexploited, especially in the case of Bulgaria. 
The paper suggests empirical results from simulation exercises conducted to ob-
tain numerical estimates of the potential effects of proposals for policy reforms 
concerning income taxation, social assistance and child support. These proposals 
were suggested by some of the major participants in the Bulgarian 2017 parlia-
mentary election campaigns. The results show that any introduction (or alteration) 
of policy instrument that has an impact on a large mass of potential beneficiaries 
will induce a substantial budgetary deficit, which, in some cases, can compromise 
the low-deficit policy of Bulgarian governments compliant with the Maastricht 
deficit criterion. In this respect, one example can be pinpointed, in respect to the 
proposal concerning the minimum threshold of BGN 300 for the old age pension 
– when they were part of the governmental coalition, the proposers compromised 
on a threshold of BGN 200 to be introduced from October 1st 2017 (which led to 
an agreement for parliamentary approval of the necessary adjustment of the cen-
tral budget for year 2017.
The results presented above clearly show the need for further in-depth analysis of 
each of these proposals involving alterations of related policy instruments that 
could compensate fully or partially for the negative budgetary effect. Any such 
further analysis could include, in the first place, the design and simulation of an 
integrated scheme for child treatment through PIT, including joint filing and tar-
geted coordination of family support policies – both contributory and assistance-
based provision of child benefits. Another important and sensitive problem for 
Bulgarian society is pension system reform – it definitely requires the exploration 
of a refined simulation of minimum thresholds for contributory pensions coordi-
nated with the provision of disability and inheritance pension components.
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